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Abstract 
In phase one of this research, (Gamble, 2020, Brook 2020), DoD areas on the GAO’s High-Risk 
List (HRL) were compared to similar longstanding high-risk non-Defense programs to determine if 
the DoD is a high-risk anomaly. Three attributes characterizing risk emerged: (1) the more 
technical programs have greater risk; (2) defense and national security areas have greater 
financial risk; (3) larger programs have greater, more prolonged risk. The study concluded DoD is 
a high-risk anomaly as the agency, and every area within, has two of the three attributes; but is 
not an anomaly in one as this attributes are present in non-Defense areas as well.  
From this analysis questions emerged regarding whether the DoD can ever get off the HRL and 
whether the DoD should prioritize getting off the HRL. Additionally, we perceived a theory of 
interaction between the DoD, the GAO and Congress that would influence the answers. To 
explore these questions, we examined the interaction theory and its practice, and interviewed 
over twenty current and former officials and staff experts in the GAO, the DoD and on Capitol Hill. 
The analysis amplifies the earlier findings and reveals mixed and inconclusive views on whether 
the DoD could ever get off or should even prioritize getting off the HRL in its management 
agenda. 
Introduction 
This research report is a continuation of research conducted for presentation at the 17th 
Annual Acquisition symposium exploring DoD management and specifically, the persistent 
presence of DoD areas on the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) High-Risk List 
(Gamble 2020).  Efforts to improve DOD management are persistent. Brook (2020) reports that 
proposals and initiatives come from a variety of internal and external sources, including internal 
sources such as politically-appointed leaders including the Chief Management Officer and 
internal advisors such as the Defense Business Board. External sources addressing Defense 
management include special commissions, presidential management initiatives, defense-related 
think tanks, and Congressional mandates.  
The GAO, however, is arguably the source of the largest volume of studies, audits, 
initiatives and recommendations for Defense management. For instance, between 2014 and 
2017 the GAO made a total of 1,122 individual recommendation to the DOD, averaging 280 per 
year. Of those reports, the GAO’s High-Risk List stands alone in that it is a biennial report which 
can be used to track the persistence and prominence of major management issues over time. It 
also can reveal historical changes in the GAO’s approach.  
These GAO reports also provide information to the Congress. They can review and 
recommend actions that the Congress have taken or could take to support DoD management 
reforms. The GAO reports are used for congressional oversight of DoD management through 
committee hearings and they sometimes pique the interests of individual members with 
constituency concerns over the topics addressed. 
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Review of Prior Research 
In phase one of this research, we considered whether DoD’s persistent presence on the 
GAO HRL classifies the Department as a risk anomaly. As of the 2017 High-Risk Update, DoD 
owned half of the high-risk areas that remained on the list since its inception in 1990. The 
Department’s efforts since 1990 have resulted in removal of only two areas:  DoD Supply Chain 
Management recently removed in the 2019 report after 29 years on the list; and DoD Personnel 
Security Clearance Program. But, as of the 2019 HRL update report, the DoD still owns half of 
the areas that have been on the list for more than two decades. The Department’s persistent 
presence on the list brought to question whether the DoD is a risk anomaly. Utilizing comparison 
analysis of longstanding DoD high-risk areas (DoD Contract Management and DoD Weapons 
Acquisitions) with comparable longstanding non-DoD high-risk areas (DoE Contract 
Management and NASA Acquisition Management), we determined that DoD is and is not a 
high-risk anomaly.  The analysis revealed three high-risk trends that assist in answering the 
question: (1) the more technical the program, the greater and more prolonged the risk; (2) 
association with defense and national security lends to greater financial risk; and (3) the larger 
the program and portfolio, the greater and more prolonged the risk (Gamble 2020). The DoD 
meets the anomaly qualification in that its high-risk areas are always related to defense and the 
DoD will always be a large organization managing large and costly portfolios. However, we 
found that “DoD is not a high-risk anomaly in that it is not the only agency that succumbs to 
these high-risk trends” (Gamble 2020). For instance, the DoD is not the only HRL-listed agency 
that deals with highly technical matters or matters related to defense that appear to increase 
their propensity for risk. So, by this analysis, the DoD is and is not a high-risk anomaly. 
These findings led to addition questions. What is the theoretical framework that appears 
to undergird the HRL?1 Does this apparent framework actually work in practice? Is it plausible to 
think that the DoD will ever get off the HRL? Should getting off the HRL be a management 
objective for the DoD’s chief management officer? How do the DoD and GAO view this list and 
the roles they play?  
Methodology 
To explore these and other questions, we first undertook an extensive documentary 
search consisting of GAO reports and Congressional testimony. We then gathered the 
observations, opinions and viewpoints of subject matter experts (SMEs). We analyzed the data 
from these documents and interviews to draw a more complete picture of how the theoretical 
framework operates in practice and to understand the viewpoints of knowledgeable current and 
former officials and staff experts about the DoD’s presence on the HRL. 
We identified a small number of current and former officials and staff experts in the 
GAO, the DoD and on Capitol Hill. In each case we employed the snowball technique asking all 
the interviewees to identify others whom they recommended for interviews. In total, we 
conducted 18 interview sessions involving individuals with a total of a total of 27 organizational 
affiliations, interviewed either singly or in small groups from one office. The tally of interviewees 
by organization is shown below. Some interviewees had experience in more than one 
organization and are therefore counted in more than one category. 
  
 
1 This framework is the authors’ analytical construct derived from this and prior research.  
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Table 1 
Organizational Affiliations of Interviewees 
GAO               13 
DoD               8 
Capitol Hill               2 
Other Agencies               4 
 
Due to restrictions required by COVID-19, all interviews were conducted remotely, most 
on Zoom and a few on conference call. All interviews were conducted on a not-for-attribution 
basis so as to encourage open and candid conversations. Thus, interviewees will be identified 
only as “SME #” with the date of the interview.2 The interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
The transcripts were then coded and examined to identify common themes and particularly 
salient statements. Finally, the data was categorized and this categorization is reflected in the 
following discussion and analysis. 
All the interviews were conducted as in-depth interviews, utilizing an interview guide 
from San Jose State University (SJSC 2020).  The expressed purposes of the interviews were 
to generate ideas, test hypotheses from the phase one study, and gain insights based on expert 
opinion. A short list of questions was prepared for each interview and supplementary questions 
and neutral probes were employed to draw out the interviewees’ responses. Each interview was 
closed with a catch-all question, such as: “is there anything else you would like to tell us?”  To 
assure completeness and reduce interviewer bias, both researchers participated in the 
interviews. 
Theory to Practice Construct 
Although not mandated by Congress, GAO publishes the high-risk list “to keep the 
Congress up to date on areas needing attention” within the federal government (GAO 2000). 
Since 1990 the GAO’s process for evaluating areas and making a high-risk designation has 
evolved. Ten years into the high-risk list program, the GAO developed rating criteria, as 
displayed in a five-point star, that shows each area’s progress in leadership commitment, action 
plan, monitoring, demonstrated progress, and capacity. Multiple congressional testimonies and 
reports from GAO contend that GAO’s framework for determining and subsequently addressing 
high-risk areas will result in removal from the high-risk list, provided each participant in the 
process takes the recommended actions. During phase two of this research, we sought to 
identify how GAO’s theory plays out in practice with respect to the DoD. Interviews provided 
more detailed information on GAO’s process and how each member of the process – GAO, 
Congress, OMB, and the agency (the DoD in this case) – experience it.  
The GAO High-Risk List, in Theory 
GAO publications and testimonies dating back to 1990 provide a robust account of what 
the HRL is, why it exists, and how the program is intended to function. An agency of the 
Congress, the GAO is the legislative branch’s “investigative arm” and the HRL provides 
“marching orders” for congressional subcommittees on government oversight (Cummings 2019; 
Jordan 2019). As the investigative arm, the GAO developed a Performance and Accountability 
Series that focused on “major program and mission areas” within each federal agency that 
meets certain criteria (GAO 2000). This Series is managed by the GAO’s Strategic Issues Team 
 
2 Interviews with each SME took place only once. The full and proper citation with the date of the interview is 
included in the first reference to each respective interviewee. For ease of reading, in subsequent references for 
each interviewee, the full citation is omitted and only the SME# is identified. 
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which further designates program or mission areas as high-risk when they meet quantitative and 
qualitative criteria as outlined in our report from phase one. A new addition to the HRL is never 
a surprise, whether added to the HRL as a result of ongoing work that rises to the designation of 
high-risk, such as the recent addition of Veteran’s Affairs Acquisitions added in 2019, or added 
as a new area like The Year 2000 Problem.  
The GAO’s commitment to the high-risk program is based on the belief that it is the 
mechanism needed to address the inaction of federal agencies to correct deficiencies and 
problems within management (GAO 1990). However, during the course of research it became 
apparent that the success of the high-risk program is predicated on underlying assumptions and 
the interplay between participants. One of the underlying theoretical assumptions the program 
operates from is that each area on the list can successfully be removed with improvements to 
agency management of the area. The GAO maintains this assumption despite more than a third 
of the original 14 areas remaining on the HRL after three decades. To identify why success has 
been illusive for most DoD high-risk areas, we must first understand the theoretical framework 
that the GAO utilizes. To do this, we identified what we’ve classified as key principles and 
assumptions, and examined the expectations of interplay amongst participants. 
Key Principles and Assumptions  
During the course of research, we identified several key principles that the GAO applies 
to the high-risk program. The first principle we identified is that the HRL is the mechanism to 
bring about change within the federal government to reduce agency fraud, waste, abuse, and 
mismanagement in high-risk areas. The second principle we saw is that risk does not have to be 
eliminated in order to achieve success. Rather, the GAO views success as risk management 
that results in a reduction in vulnerability to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement (personal 
communication December 17, 2019). Our third observed principle is that the GAO’s framework 
relies on transparency and cooperation between participants. The GAO’s work is only as good 
as the information it receives from agencies, the OMB, and the Congress. Lastly, the GAO high-
risk program and framework demand a non-partisan approach aimed solely at reducing risk. 
In addition to these key principles, the GAO also employs three key assumptions in the 
high-risk program framework. First, the GAO assumes it is possible for all areas on the list to 
successfully get off the list. Secondly, the GAO assumes that the federal government should 
maintain each of the areas on the HRL and work towards removal from the list as opposed to 
eliminating the area. Finally, the GAO’s framework assumes that agencies want to get off the list 
and will make an effort to do so.  
Participants Theoretical Interplay 
In addition to the principles and assumptions, the GAO high-risk program framework 
relies on an interplay between participants. The high-risk program involves four key participants: 
the GAO, the Congress, the federal agency in charge of the high-risk area, and the OMB. 
GAO’s framework assigns roles and expectations to each of these with the aim of achieving 
success. These roles and expectations are best understood when considering how GAO 
envisions the interactions amongst the participants. 
The GAO and the Federal Agency  
As the creators and managers of the HRL program, the GAO expects to play an active 
role throughout an agency’s tenure on the list. Utilizing core teams for each area, the GAO’s 
Strategic Issues Team engages with agency points of contact for high-risk areas both prior to 
and during tenure on the HRL. By the time an area is added to the HRL, the GAO team is 
expected to be fairly familiar with the area and agency. Likewise, GAO expects the agency to 
have a minimum of one agency point of contact or team to communicate with GAO on the high-
risk issues (personal communication May 29, 2020). The GAO’s framework design expects the 
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GAO and agency teams to meet periodically to review the status of the high-risk area and any 
actions taken by the agency. The GAO’s framework does not prescribe the frequency of 
meetings between the GAO and the agencies, but the GAO’s best practices encourage 
agencies to have regular engagements with GAO teams. The GAO’s best practices for HRL 
progress and removal focus heavily on the agency. Agencies must: 
• Know the criteria for removal and how GAO is assessing them 
• Develop action plans with measures and agreed upon goals 
• Engage with GAO as actions taken 
• Demonstrate sustained senior leadership commitment and build congressional support 
• Ensure support and capacity to execute plans 
• Demonstrate sustained progress, capable of spanning Administrations 
• Coordinate on shared and government-wide areas (GAO 2019a). 
Additionally, The GAO’s dedicated teams and willingness to assist attest to its commitment to 
the high-risk program. The GAO routinely identifies and publishes best practices for high-risk 
and program specific issues, and encourages inter-agency crosstalk to share lessons learned.  
The biennial high-risk updates prepared for Congress are integral to the high-risk 
program framework. GAO has set the precedent to supply agencies with a draft of the updates, 
along with an opportunity to provide feedback, before publication. Agencies are expected to 
provide feedback to ensure an accurate portrayal of progress is captured. In conjunction with 
the biennial reports, the GAO provides additional support to the agencies through detailed 
reports on specific issues within a high-risk area. These reports supplement the high-risk update 
and provide a more detailed account of each area. The GAO’s essential expectation for 
interaction with agencies is that the agencies are willing to cooperate and work toward change. 
The GAO and the Congress  
For over twenty years, the GAO’s framework has included issues requiring 
congressional attention and recommended congressional actions on the high-risk updates (U.S. 
Congress 2005). In a March 2019 House Committee on Oversight and Reform hearing, 
Comptroller General Eugene Dodaro testified that “where we’ve seen progress, congressional 
hand has been at play” (Dodaro 2019). The GAO has no authority in and of itself to mandate 
agency action, but as an agency of the Congress, the GAO’s framework relies on the 
Congress’s willingness to oversee the management of high-risk areas and encourage or even 
mandate action. The GAO’s expectations of the Congress also include cooperation during 
preparation for the biennial report publication by providing feedback on drafted 
recommendations for Congressional actions. With the release of the biennial reports, the 
Comptroller General testifies before congressional committees with a team of experts to provide 
robust assessment and feedback on the state of the HRL. The GAO expects that Congress will 
continue to discuss and act on the recommendations for Congressional action.  
The Congress and the Federal Agency 
 The high-risk framework includes interactions between the Congress and the agencies 
via congressional testimony, correspondence, NDAA mandates, and relationship building. Best 
practices from the GAO include engagement on the side of the agency and the Congress to 
ensure effective change. The framework also requires Congress to conduct the agency 
oversight required to ensure mandates are adhered to by the agencies.  
The Office of Management and Budget 
The GAO has long-held the view that the Office of Management and Budget, in the 
Executive Office of the President, needs to take a more active role in the high-risk program by 
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designating an individual to lead the fight against fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement 
(U.S. Congress 2005). The OMB is seen as a key role player as well by Congress, with Senator 
Voinovich highlighting in a 2005 hearing that the President’s Management Agenda has the 
ability to “create a confluence of ideas and synergy” that can lead to significant reform 
(Voinovich 2005). However, the OMB’s role in the high-risk process was only a recommendation 
until late 2016 with the passing of the Program Management Improvement Accountability Act 
(PMIAA). The PMIAA is an example of Congress fulfilling expectations and acting on GAO 
recommendations. Specifically, the PMIAA mandates the OMB’s Deputy Director for 
Management to review HRL area portfolios and receive recommendations from a Program 
Management Policy Council focused on improving management and high-risk areas (GAO 
2019b). The theoretical GAO framework relies on the active participation of the Deputy Director 
of Management to mandate and oversee the implementation of recommended changes to high-
risk areas. Additionally, the principle of transparency applies to the OMB. Between high-risk 
update issuances, the GAO provides the OMB with a draft of the HRL report and opportunity to 
provide feedback on the assessment and recommendations (U.S. Congress 2019). In order for 
the high-risk program to be successful, the theoretical framework requires OMB’s active 
participation, transparency, and cooperation with GAO. 
In theory then, with a synergistic approach by the GAO, the Congress, the DoD 
(agency), and the OMB, one could expect each evaluation criterion in the DoD’s high-risk areas 
to be eventually satisfied and the areas removed from the HRL. However, five DoD areas 
remain on the list after two decades with progress fluctuating over the course of the tenure. We 
attempt to answer why by assessing how the theory plays out in practice. 
 
Figure 1 
Observed High Risk List Theoretical Framework 
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The High-Risk List in Practice: Challenges to the Apparent Framework 
From the GAO’s perspective, the integrity of the framework is often compromised by 
congressional and agency inaction. GAO officials identified that the HRL is not of the necessary 
level of importance within the DoD to result in the required progress (personal communication 
October 28, 2019). Agencies that have seen great progress, such as the Department of 
Homeland Security, have done so by making the HRL an internal priority and increasing 
cooperation with the GAO (personal communication August 17, 2020). Across various high-risk 
areas, the GAO routinely sees as lack of implementation of best practices and 
recommendations. Agencies may list best practices in their action plan but fail to establish 
measures of accountability for their implementation.  
The GAO, agencies, and the OMB all see leadership as a lynchpin to addressing risk. 
However, all three players acknowledge that leadership transitions, as often a result of political 
appointment, greatly hinder agency efforts (U.S. Congress 2005; U.S. Congress 2019). In 
addition to leadership longevity, much of the effort placed on the HRL by agencies and the OMB 
is driven by leadership priorities and personality. In 2019, the Comptroller General testified to 
Congress on the White House’s unwillingness to cooperate with the GAO, greatly hindering 
GAO’s assessment of cybersecurity and denying the GAO information regarding the 
Administration’s actions to address issues of concern (U.S. Congress 2019).  
From the agency perspective, the framework is unreliable because the GAO fails to 
meet expectations when it comes to expertise in agency operations. While the GAO attempts to 
understand the DoD’s management practices and processes, a lack of understanding can lead 
to recommendations that are not feasible for execution.     
The GAO’s identification of issues requiring congressional attention is necessary, but the 
framework requires congressional action. While the HRL is an effective tool for Congress and a 
helpful reference, individual program reports (often mandated by Congress) often garner more 
attention and subsequent action (personal communication May 27, 2020). Overall, however, 
Congressional interest in oversight of agency reform is often limited to just a few members and 
occasional subcommittee hearings. 
After considering challenges of executing the theoretical framework, we took the next 
step to explore the findings through interviews with subject matter experts. Our purpose was to 
test and validate the analysis and conclusions that were derived at this point in our research. 
We sought to determine how the theoretical construct of the HRL plays out in actual practice. 
Theory to Practice – The Viewpoints of Experts 
Data gathered from interviews, presented below, was categorized and analyzed based 
first on questions that arose from the phase one study and secondly based on topics which 
arose in the course of the interviews. The interview data fall into five identifiable categories of 
research questions: how is the theory of interactions between agencies, GAO, and Congress 
put into practice concerning the DoD; could the DoD ever get off the HRL; should the DoD 
prioritize getting off the HRL and, if so, what are proven strategies and best practices for making 
progress on HRL areas; and ultimately, is the DoD an anomaly? 
Interactions Between Agencies, GAO and Congress 
The interactions between the three major actors concerned with the HRL, the agencies, 
the GAO and Congress, reflect the roles each plays in public management. Concerning 
specifically the DoD’s presence on the HRL, the DoD is responsible for the day-to-day and long-
term management of the department; the GAO conducts management audits and provides 
evaluations and advice on management improvement; and the Congress provides oversight, 
receives reports, and can mandate management actions. Both the bilateral relationship between 
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the GAO and the DoD, and the trilateral interaction between the GAO, the DoD, and Congress, 
were explored in interviews with current and former officials associated with each participant. 
Bilateral Interaction between the GAO and the DoD  
The foundational theory behind the HRL suggests that the three actors – the DoD, The 
GAO and the Congress play specific and complementary roles in a collective effort to reduce 
the high-cost risk of fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement. Our interviews indicated that both 
bilateral and trilateral relationships exist in this framework. The most frequently observed 
relationship is that between the GAO and the DoD. We explored the nature of that relationship 
with SMEs from the two organizations. SME 2 (personal communication, July 1, 2020) said that 
in the early periods of the HRL the relationship between the GAO and the DoD was mostly 
adversarial, but other interviewees said the relationship today has more interaction and 
collaboration. For instance, SME 6 (personal communication, May 25, 2020), a GAO source, 
observed that DoD and GAO teams touch base several times a year to discuss high risk issues 
with senior DoD personnel and that GAO meets nearly weekly with mid-level personnel. SME 8 
(personal communication, October 28, 2019) cited quarterly senior level meetings between the 
DoD and GAO and saw there was “a lot of good interaction throughout the year.” SME 12 
(personal communication, July 3, 2020), a DoD source, described reaching out to establish 
relationships with senior staff and instituting consistent ongoing dialogue. 
Notwithstanding this current collaborative environment between the DoD and GAO, 
there are issues. One is the extent to which DoD believes the GAO understands its business 
operations. SME 2, a GAO official, said “We know DoD’s business very well from an outsider’s 
perspective. We will never say that we know the things from the inside.”  SME 9 (personal 
communication, June 15, 2020) a DoD official, claims that the GAO’s findings often tend to 
corroborate what DoD knows internally but that sometimes GAO recommends actions that DoD 
probably cannot do; “the organization of the department doesn’t always allow certain solutions 
for complex problems.” The DoD does attempt to explain its operations to the GAO. SME 12 
says the DoD does make an effort to explain the way they do business to the GAO. But, SME 8 
is not quite so patient: “When it is just an academic exercise and people don’t have the 
experience, DoD is not going to listen to them.”  
Bilateral Interaction between the GAO and Congress and between the DoD and Congress 
A second set of bilateral relationships exist between the GAO and the Congress 
independent of the DoD and between the DoD and the Congress independent of the GAO. 
The GAO was created in the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 as the General 
Accounting Office to be the principal financial analytical agency of the Congress. Over time its 
work expanded to include monitoring executive branch agencies’ programs and spending. In 
2004 its name was changed to the Government Accountability Office. The GAO is an agency of 
the legislative branch and reports to and takes direction from the Congress. (GAO 2020). 
As an agency of the Congress, the GAO has a relationship with the Congress and key 
congressional committees well beyond the topic of the DoD and the HRL. GAO conducts other 
audits of the DoD, either self-initiated or requested by Congress. The GAO issues individual 
reports on these audits and its officials testify frequently before congressional committees.  
Between 2014 and 2017 the GAO made a total of 1122 individual recommendation to the DOD, 
averaging 280 per year. For this period, it identified 68 priority recommendations in the areas of 
acquisition and contract management (25 priority recommendations), readiness (14), financial 
management (11), health care (7), cyber security (5), headquarters management (3), support 
infrastructure (2), and information technology (1) (GAO, 2018, p. 25). 72% of the GAO’s 
recommendations in this four-year period addressed management issues in categories both 
similar to and different from those found in the HRL. Any of these reports could become the 
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topic of congressional oversight hearings or a source for legislation. Thus, GAO has much 
greater potential for interaction with the Congress on DoD-related topics other than the HRL. 
The biennial HRL, however, is always a subject of congressional hearings with the GAO upon 
release of the report. 
The DoD was formulated with the creation of the National Military Establishment in 1947 
and eventually as the Department of Defense in an amendment to the 1949 National Security 
Act (DoD, 2020). The organization and functions of the Department are codified in law in USC 
Title X. Like the GAO, the DoD has multiple interactions with the Congress outside the scope of 
the HRL. Many of the interactions deal with national security issues, such as the annual posture 
statement testimonies by DoD and the military departments, but many of them also address 
management topics. Congress directly addresses DoD management issues when it reviews 
funding and program authorizations through the annual Defense Appropriations Act and the 
National Defense Authorization Act, both of which can include mandates and requirements 
concerning Defense management.  In fact, as shown in charts 1 and 2 below, Congress has 
been steadily increasing its organizational and management mandates through the general 
provisions of the annual appropriations act in the overall increase in the size of the annual 
authorization act. 
Chart 1 
Number of General Provisions in the Defense Appropriations Acts, 1970-2019 
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Chart 2 
Number of Pages in the NDAA 
 
Source: Candreva (2017), p.49. 
Trilateral Relationship Between the Congress, the GAO and the DoD 
How then does Congress exercise oversight of the DoD and the GAO within the context 
of the HRL? SME 1 (personal communication, June 10, 2020) explained that the HRL 
assessment is not “sponsored” (i.e., directed) by Congress. Rather it is an initiative of the GAO 
(as contrasted with individual studies that are directed by or sponsored in Congress). 
Nevertheless, the entire biennial HRL update is always the subject of Congressional hearings. 
These hearings generally take place before the House Committee on Oversight and Reform and 
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. In addition, HRL areas 
specific to the DoD can be the subject of hearings before the respective House and Senate 
armed services committees. SME 4 (personal communication, November 12, 2019) said there 
were times when the Senate Armed Service Committee would hold a hearing on the HRL, but it 
was more likely for the committee to hold a hearing on a set of specific defense management 
issues arising from individual GAO reports where the HRL would come out in discussion. 
What then is congressional interest in the HRL? SME 11 (personal communication, May 
27, 2020) explained that some HRL-related areas have been included in the NDAA. Sponsors of 
the legislation will cite the HRL when they put something into the NDAA. In hearings, when GAO 
wants to make a recommendation, it would have some members of Congress reach out and ask 
about that recommendation and what they could put in the NDAA to fix it.  Sometimes Members 
will have a political agenda that coincides with what is on the HRL and they will use the list to 
assert their agenda is credible because GAO is producing these reports. SME 9 identified that 
Capitol Hill interactions on the HRL depend on the broader congressional agenda, explaining 
that there is no separate callout in saying that “this is on the HRL,” but sometimes there is a 
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pointing out the 2019 HRL report acknowledges the involvement of Congress, saying “Congress 
also continues to take important actions. For example, Congress has enacted a number of laws 
since our last report in February 2017 that are helping to make progress on high-risk issues.” 
(GAO, 2019b, p. 1) SME 11 noted that the HRL is mostly used as a “helper tool,” not as a 
standalone product that the Committees look at. Instead, it appears the committees are more 
interested and responsive to individual GAO reports rather than the broader HRL.  
Congressional interest, sometimes encouraged by GAO, can be used to motivate DoD 
to address areas on the HRL. SME 6 thinks the committee hearings have great impact if the 
Administration and Congress both support a recommendation. SME 10 agrees, saying when 
Congress holds hearings, they are well-attended and, in some cases, GAO’s presentation of the 
HRL to Congress gives reason for DoD to act on its own internally-generated management 
reforms. Thus, both the GAO and the DoD can use Congress to leverage action on topics in the 
HRL but according to SME 4, the DoD doesn’t come to the Senate to ask for legislation to help it 
in dealing with a high-risk program just because it’s on the HRL.  
Role of the Office of Management and Budget 
The GAO framework envisions a significant role for the Office of Management and 
Budget. We explored this issue with SMEs knowledgeable about the OMB’s involvement with 
the HRL. SME 7 said there were times when OMB tried to broker agreements on some 
management issues in sessions with the GAO and the DoD. SME 9 said it depended on who 
the “risk owners” were. The DoD owns the risks specific to it and OMB is more concerned with 
government-wide risks. SME 17 (personal communication, July 20, 2020), an OMB official, 
agreed that OMB’s interests were in management themes crosscutting across agencies but said 
there was “no systematic connection between HRL and the OMB-managed President’s 
Management Agenda.” Nor has OMB analyzed what would be required to get off the HRL. In 
fact, the President’s Management Agenda addresses only some of the GAO’s high-risk issues. 
In summary, it seems clear in the interviews that there is a good deal of HRL-related 
interaction between staffs of the GAO and the DoD, including periodic meetings at very senior 
levels. If the relationship between them was once adversarial it appears to be more 
collaborative today, though not without some friction points. Collaboration can vary by high-risk 
area and in some cases the collaboration amounted to periodic pro forma meetings, after which 
both the DoD and GAO returned to doing things their own way. There also appears to be 
significant bilateral interaction between the GAO and Congress, as one might expect. As an 
agency of Congress, the GAO reports regularly to the relevant committees about Defense 
management issues including the HRL. But the greater attention seems to be paid to individual 
GAO studies and reports rather than to the every-two-years HRL. The GAO can also leverage 
its position with Congress to motivate the DoD to address certain issues including those on the 
HRL. There seems to be less bilateral direct interaction between the DoD and Congress 
regarding the HRL outside of committee hearings and periodic meetings with congressional 
staff. Finally, there is scant evidence from the SMEs to suggest much productive trilateral 
collaborative interaction on HRL areas between the three entities. 
Getting Off the HRL 
A second theme that arises deals with the issue of getting off the HRL. This theme 
considers questions about (1) whether the DoD could ever really get off the list, and (2) whether 
the DoD’s management agenda should prioritize getting off the list, and, if so, what successful 
practices could the DoD employ to make progress toward removal from the HRL. 
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Could the DoD Ever Get Off the HRL? 
The long-tenure of some of the DoD’s areas on the HRL raise questions about whether 
the DoD could ever get completely off the list. Some of the interviewees were skeptical, others 
were more optimistic. Virtually all of the GAO officials we interviewed expressed the opinion that 
the DoD could get its areas off the HRL. Some in the DoD, principally those who had been 
involved with a successful effort to get an item off the list were also somewhat optimistic. But 
most DoD officials we interviewed saw the DoD’s HRL areas to be inherently risky and costly, 
and thus think the DoD will always be on the list. GAO officials, however, tended to 
acknowledge that risk exists in the DoD’s areas and cannot be eliminated completely, but with 
proper management reform the DoD can come off the list. SME 4 acknowledges that good 
Defense management is important but that the HRL is largely not a list of solvable problems for 
the DoD. SME 7 agrees, saying everyone wants the DoD to be more efficient but the complexity 
of everything that DoD manages is going to bring risk.  
On the other hand, SME 3 and SME 2, both of them GAO officials, are more positive. 
They point out that the DoD has recently had two high-risk areas removed from the list - 
personnel security clearances and supply chain management - and other complex HRL areas 
like terrorism and information sharing have come off the list. High-risk areas don’t have to 
eliminate risk to get off the HRL, they need only to move from “high risk” to “risk”. SME 9 a DoD 
official, somewhat concurs, observing that the Department’s management agenda now is 
looking more closely at HRL areas in addition to individual GAO reports. So, there is a 
perceived difference in perspective here. While the GAO views getting off the list as managing 
the risk so that it is lower, the DoD perspective seems to some to mean eliminating the risk. 
Should the DoD Prioritize Getting Off the HRL? 
If there is at least disagreement over whether DoD could ever get off the list, the obvious 
next question is whether the DoD should prioritize getting off the list. This question involves both 
the probability of success and the incentives for trying.  There is some disagreement among the 
SMEs interviewed about the extent to which the DoD should prioritize getting off the HRL in its 
management agenda.  SME 5 makes the case for trying, saying that being on the HRL is fair but 
that getting off the list is not really central to the DoD management agenda. Both SME 10 a 
GAO official and SME 12, a DoD official answered simply “yes” to a question about whether 
DoD should be trying to get off the list, SME 12 adding emphatically, “I want to get off the list.” 
SME 8 believes the DoD just isn’t going to prioritize the HRL. Instead, they are going to 
do things aligned with executing the national security strategy, prioritizing the mission over the 
HRL. Added to the negative argument now is the disestablishment of the Office of the Chief 
Management Officer in the FY 2021 NDAA. Some SMEs had pointed to the CMO as the logical 
responsible party to take ownership of the high-risk areas. Furthermore, neither the incentives 
nor disincentives clearly align with getting off the list. There seems to be little penalty for being 
on the list, except for some discomfort in occasional congressional hearings on the subject of 
the HRL. SME 16, a DoD official said “Congressional pressure has been the biggest” incentive 
to get DoD off the HRL. Conversely, SME 15, a GAO interviewee said “It should be in their 
(DoD’s) interest because they could get more money.” There is little indication however that 
Defense appropriations decisions are influenced by the HRL; SME 8 argued that the DoD did 
not receive any more money for recently getting areas off the HRL. Even though SME 15 said it 
is “embarrassing” to be on the HRL, there are few rewards for getting off the list aside from the 
intrinsic reward felt by individual managers whose areas make progress or get off the list. SME 
8 said the only incentive was “personal satisfaction and that is it.”  
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 147 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Successful Practices Toward Removal from the HRL 
If DoD were to prioritize getting areas off the HRL are there successful practices that it 
might follow? Reflecting on the early days of the HRL, SME 2 said that at the time DoD contract 
management and weapons systems came onto the HRL, a lot of the decisions about what to put 
on the list were judgement calls, not very objective or methodical. In some cases, such as 
weapons systems acquisition, size and visibility were the major factors in getting on the list. 
SME-10 (personal communication, December 17, 2019), speaking from a GAO perspective, 
admitted that when the HRL began there were also no clear criteria for getting on or off the list. 
Now, however, the GAO’s use of the five-pointed star rubric for measuring progress provide 
some credit for DoD efforts. SME 5 (personal communication, June 8, 2020), a DoD official, 
doesn’t disagree that the DoD belongs on the high-risk list, but just wants the GAO to “give us 
credit for where progress is being made.” 
And, in fact, the DoD has been successful recently in getting two areas off the HRL. 
SME 13 (personal communication, July 30, 2020) explained the DoD’s process for getting 
supply chain management off the HRL. It essentially involved attacking each element of GAO’s 
five-star evaluation system separately or sequentially. Initially the focus was on leadership, 
getting the two-star logisticians to establish a plan. Next came a comprehensive action plan and 
the dedication of resources. Metrics were established and periodic monitoring took place and 
policies were changed as needed. DoD was transparent throughout the process with the GAO 
in attendance for the DoD’s internal meetings. 
Goal setting and accountability are cited by SME 1 (personal communication, June 10, 
2020) pointing out that the Department of Homeland Security has prioritized getting off the HRL 
within three years. They hold their executives accountable toward addressing the GAO’s 
recommendations. SME 16 (personal communication, August 17, 2020) said Congress played a 
role in motivating DHS by requiring DHS to cooperate more with GAO. DHS thus realized over 
time that the HRL was going to be the cause of a lot of congressional pressure so the 
department’s leadership there got pretty serious about it. With DHS’s approach being mentioned 
multiple times as a model, the question arises: are the DoD and DHS analogous when it comes 
to the HRL? SME 3 answered “yes” but was quick to point out the difference in scale. For 
instance, both agencies have business systems modernization on the HRL but DHS’s total IT 
budget was $9 billion while DoD’s spending for business systems alone would exceed that 
amount. SME 16 however, thought DHS is just as complicated if not more than DoD. SME 16 
went on to say that the argument that DoD is unique is convenient, getting off the list is just a 
matter of how much the leadership in each department wants to take it seriously. 
Is the DoD making any progress toward getting more high-risk areas off the list? SME 6 
currently sees a strong commitment in DoD to address high risk issues. There is more 
leadership commitment scored in the latest report and they are trying to create robust action 
plans. That is what is needed now. SME 17 advises that if DoD wants to prioritize getting off the 
list it should work to get specific language in support of those efforts into the NDAA. 
In summary, the SMEs who participated in the interviews reflect mixed views of the 
questions about whether the DoD could get off the HRL and if it should even prioritize doing so. 
Strong arguments suggest that the DoD’s size, complexity and the nature of its programs will 
always result on exceeding the GAO’s threshold for high risk. Other equally powerful 
arguments, that an agency consuming half of the nation’s discretionary budget has a 
responsibility to strive for better management and that success is possible as seen with the 
removal of two DoD areas from the HRL, prove that it should and can be done. In either case, 
it’s clear that there are steps that the DoD could take to make progress on HRL areas, get credit 
for progress, and work toward getting at least some of them off the list.  
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 148 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Again, the question of getting off the HRL and whether the DoD should prioritize it 
seems highly influenced by the perspectives of DoD and GAO officials. The GAO perspective is 
that the DoD doesn’t need to eliminate risk, just manage it to a lower, more acceptable level. 
But the apparent DoD perspective is that its programs are inherently risky because they are 
large in scale, high cost, and usually involve development of new technologies and new 
products. The perspective of those SMEs who were involved with areas that got off the list, saw 
it as possible and worth striving for. Perspective seems to be a material consideration in this 
question. 
Is DoD an Anomaly? 
To return to our original research question, is the DoD a high-risk anomaly? We end up 
in the same position as in the first phase of this research (Gamble 2020) as indicated in the 
views of three SMEs: SME 6 says yes, DoD is huge in scope and that makes it different; SME-
12 (personal communication, June 30, 2020) disagrees, at least when compared to some other 
large complex agencies like DHS; SME 17 cautions that the DoD’s scale may be a factor in 
GAO’s capacity for analyzing defense management even though it devotes more of its capacity 
to national security than to any other area. 
Conclusion and Observations 
The answer to the question of whether the DoD is a high-risk anomaly remains 
ambiguous. The DoD is certainly characterized by the three main attributes of high-risk. But, so 
are some other agencies on the HRL. On the other hand, some DoD areas have managed to 
get off the HRL. When asked about the DoD’s presence on the HRL, GAO, DoD and 
Congressional subject matter experts disagreed, with most GAO experts and a few DoD experts 
believing that it would be possible for the DoD to get off the list. More DoD experts thought the 
DoD could never get completely off the list owing to its size, complexity and high-dollar 
programs. 
Our analysis concludes the theoretical framework of the HRL, with its expected roles and 
responsibilities for the GAO, the DoD, the OMB and the Congress is not fully functional in 
practice. It is true that there is cooperation and collaboration between the GAO and the DoD at 
both the functional and senior leadership levels that can lead to management improvement 
even if not achieving complete removal from the HRL. But the roles of the OMB and the 
Congress seem less active. The OMB’s response to the PMIAA by citing the HRL in its circular 
A-11 doesn’t appear to actually require the agencies or Deputy Director to do anything to further 
the goal of getting off the HRL other than to make a report. Similarly, the interest of Congress in 
the HRL seem only episodic and person- or constituency-driven. Interviews across the agencies 
suggest that the individual GAO audit reports receive more attention and prompt more 
corrective action than does the HRL. In the absence of tangible incentives there seems to be 
little in the way of motivation for the DoD to prioritize getting off the HRL. Instead, as more than 
one DoD SME argued, if the Department just works to improve its management policies and 
practices, making progress on the HRL and perhaps even getting off the list, would be a 
pleasant by-product. 
Finally, it is clear that the HRL is an invention of the GAO. The HRL was not mandated 
by Congress nor does it have a particular congressional owner, either a committee or individual 
legislators. The GAO also lacks enforcement authority beyond persuasion and the public 
scrutiny that comes from biennial congressional hearings. 
Ultimately, though the DoD is and is not a high-risk anomaly, whether or not it prioritizes 
making progress and getting off the HRL is a question that characterizes all of the DoD’s 
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management initiatives. The DoD will undertake to respond to the HRL when doing so directly 
serves the mission of the Department. 
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